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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

**U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
L.P.**

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID CHIU, in his official capacity
as Attorney for the City and County of
San Francisco, California,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:24-cv-00395-WHO

**PROPOSED BRIEF OF AMICI
CURIAE MEDIA
ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO STRIKE**

Judge William H. Orrick
Hearing Date: April 10, 2024
Hearing Time: 2 p.m.

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

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2 First Amendment Coalition is a nonprofit organization with no parent
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4 company. It issues no stock and does not own any of the party's or amicus' stock.

5 The Media Law Resource Center has no parent corporation and issues no
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7 stock.

8 News/Media Alliance is a nonprofit, non-stock corporation organized under the
9 laws of the commonwealth of Virginia. It has no parent company.

10 The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press s an unincorporated
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12 association of reporters and editors with no parent corporation and no stock.

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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

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2 Lead amicus the **Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press** (“Reporters
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4 Committee”) is an unincorporated non-profit association founded by leading
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6 journalists and media lawyers in 1970 when the nation’s news media faced an
7
8 unprecedented wave of government subpoenas forcing reporters to name confidential
9
10 sources. Today, its attorneys provide pro bono legal representation, amicus curiae
11
12 support, and other legal resources to protect First Amendment freedoms and the
13
14 newsgathering rights of journalists. The Reporters Committee regularly serves as
15
16 amicus curiae in federal and California courts, involving in matters concerning
17
18 government subpoenas. *See, e.g.*, Brief of Amicus Curiae Reporters Comm. for
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20 Freedom of the Press in Supp. of Plaintiff-Appellant, *X Corp v. Bonta*, No. 24-271
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22 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2024); Brief of Amicus Curiae Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
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24 the Press in Supp. of Appellees, *CoreCivic v. Candide Grp., LLC*, 20-17285 (9th Cir.
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26 Oct. 26, 2021).

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28 **First Amendment Coalition** (“FAC”) is a nonprofit public interest
organization dedicated to defending free speech, free press and open government
rights in order to make government, at all levels, more accountable to the people. The
Coalition’s mission assumes that government transparency and an informed
electorate are essential to a self-governing democracy. FAC advances this purpose by
working to improve governmental compliance with state and federal open

1 government laws. FAC’s activities include free legal consultations on access to public
2 records and First Amendment issues, educational programs, legislative oversight of
3 California bills affecting access to government records and free speech, and public
4 advocacy, including extensive litigation and appellate work. FAC’s members are
5 news organizations, law firms, libraries, civic organizations, academics, freelance
6 journalists, bloggers, activists, and ordinary citizens.
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9 The **Media Law Resource Center, Inc.** (“MLRC”) is a non-profit professional
10 association for content providers in all media, and for their defense lawyers,
11 providing a wide range of resources on media and content law, as well as policy
12 issues. These include news and analysis of legal, legislative and regulatory
13 developments; litigation resources and practice guides; and national and international
14 media law conferences and meetings. The MLRC also works with its membership to
15 respond to legislative and policy proposals, and speaks to the press and public on
16 media law and First Amendment issues. It counts as members over 125 media
17 companies, including newspaper, magazine and book publishers, TV and radio
18 broadcasters, and digital platforms, and over 200 law firms working in the media law
19 field. The MLRC was founded in 1980 by leading American publishers and
20 broadcasters to assist in defending and protecting free press rights under the First
21 Amendment.
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1 **News/Media Alliance** (“N/MA”) represents over 2,200 diverse publishers in
2 the U.S. and internationally, ranging from the largest news and magazine publishers
3 to hyperlocal newspapers, and from digital-only outlets to papers who have printed
4 news since before the Constitutional Convention. Its membership creates quality
5 journalistic content that accounts for nearly 90 percent of daily newspaper circulation
6 in the U.S., over 500 individual magazine brands, and dozens of digital-only
7 properties. N/MA diligently advocates for newspapers, magazine, and digital
8 publishers, on issues that affect them today.

9 Amici have a strong interest in preserving legal protections for the editorial
10 independence of journalists and news organizations, including—and perhaps
11 especially—with respect to opinion journalism, where editorial choices by private
12 speakers that are perceived as unfavorable or “biased” by state actors could become
13 the target of government scrutiny or improper enforcement actions. Here, the Office
14 of the Attorney of the City and County of San Francisco David Chiu (“City Attorney”
15 or “Chiu”) has issued subpoenas that, on their face, require plaintiff U.S. News &
16 World Report L.P. (“U.S. News” or “Plaintiff”) to disclose details about its
17 methodology for ranking hospitals, out of a stated concern for perceived “bias.”
18 Because the City Attorney’s subpoenas seek to intrude into the constitutionally
19 protected process of editorial decision-making, amici urge the Court to deny the City
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1 Attorney's motion to dismiss and/or to strike and grant Plaintiff's motion for
2 preliminary injunction.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

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2 This is not a commercial speech case. The City Attorney has issued subpoenas
3 concerning Plaintiff’s hospital rankings that intrude directly into Plaintiff’s First
4 Amendment-protected editorial decision-making and, worse, do so because of the
5 City Attorney’s publicly stated criticism of those decisions. The City Attorney issued
6 the subpoenas in connection with an investigation of the U.S. News rankings for
7 alleged violations of California Business and Professions Code section 17200, *et seq.*,
8 the “Unfair Competition Law” (“UCL”), which prohibits, among other things,
9 misleading or deceptive commercial advertising. Compl. Ex. D (Dkt. 1-4). But the
10 subpoenas, on their face, go well beyond the proper scope of the UCL. For example,
11 they demand the “basis for not including measures of health equity” in the rankings;
12 an explanation for “how, if at all, [U.S. News] has incorporated primary and
13 preventive care” as a factor; the basis for weighting certain treatments more than
14 others; and details about U.S. News’ use of Medicare data as factors. *Id.* (Dkt. 1-4 at
15 pp. 4–5). One interrogatory asks U.S. News to articulate its basis for stating that its
16 “rankings are ‘[h]ow to find the best medical care in 2023.’” *Id.* (Dkt. 1-4 at pp. 4–
17 5). In public statements announcing his inquiry into U.S. News’ rankings, the City
18 Attorney cited what he called “questionable methodology, bias & undisclosed
19 financial relationships,” and his view that the rankings “appear to be biased towards
20 providing treatment for wealthy, white patients, to the detriment of poorer, sicker, or
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1 more diverse populations[.]” Compl. ¶¶ 53–54. None of these avenues of inquiry—
2 or proffered justifications for them—are permissible under the First Amendment or
3 California law. To conclude otherwise would open the door to improper government
4 efforts to mandate editorial “fairness”—as state officials define it—under the guise of
5 consumer protection. Amici offer four points in support of U.S. News’ preliminary
6 injunction motion.
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9 First, a news organization’s *methodology* for reviews or rankings is not an
10 appropriate topic of investigation under a state’s consumer protection laws.
11 Decisions as to which factors to consider and the relative weighting of those factors
12 in reviews and rankings are both inherently subjective and exercises of journalism,
13 not commercial speech. This is true regardless whether entities ranked also purchase
14 advertising; the fact that for-profit media entities publish paid-for advertisements in
15 connection with their news and entertainment programming does not, as a matter of
16 law, affect the constitutionally protected status of their underlying content. *Cf. N.Y.*
17 *Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (“That the Times was paid for
18 publishing the advertisement is as immaterial [to application of the First Amendment]
19 as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.”); *Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v.*
20 *Connaughton*, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (“If a profit motive could somehow strip
21 communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases from
22 *New York Times to Hustler Magazine* would be little more than empty vessels.”).
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1 Second, the subpoenas expressly target U.S. News based on viewpoint. They
2 stem from the City Attorney’s stated concerns about “bias” and that the rankings may
3 be “warping our healthcare system.” Compl. ¶ 53 & Ex. D (first subpoena); *see also*
4 *id.* Ex. E (second subpoena). This attempt to intrude into U.S. News’ editorial
5 decision-making to impose content the City Attorney deems fairer, cannot pass
6 constitutional muster. *Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo*, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
7

8 Third, the City Attorney’s argument that U.S. News’ claims are non-justiciable
9 is incorrect and particularly dangerous in this context. Courts routinely permit pre-
10 enforcement challenges alleging First Amendment harm to proceed. And given the
11 chilling effect of official intrusions into the editorial process, amici respectfully urge
12 the Court to do so here.
13

14 Fourth and finally, the threat posed to a free and independent press is
15 compounded by the City Attorney’s invocation of the California anti-SLAPP law,
16 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, to argue that *he* is the speaker and that U.S. News’
17 lawsuit is an effort to silence *his* protected speech activity (i.e., issuing subpoenas to
18 investigate U.S. News’ newsgathering and editorial processes).
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20 For all these reasons, amici urge the Court to grant U.S. News’ Motion for
21 Preliminary Injunction and deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and/or Strike.
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ARGUMENT

I. The City Attorney’s subpoenas target non-commercial speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.

It is the rare news organization that does not offer some form of review or recommendation for products or services. *See generally* Will Tavlin, *Under Review*, Colum. Journalist Rev. (Oct. 16, 2023), [perma.cc/5K6Q-9SL7] (surveying history and current state of “service journalism”).¹ Such reviews and rankings, and the methodology underlying them are entitled to full First Amendment protection. *Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.*, 466 U.S. 485, 488 (1984) (applying heightened *New York Times v. Sullivan* standard to magazine’s product review). To apply less-protective commercial speech doctrine to government attempts to intrude into the editorial process that underlies such journalism would open the door to direct state intervention in public discourse in the name of consumer protection.

¹ Like reviews of restaurants and movies, product and service reviews, including rankings, are staples in many news organizations’ coverage. *See, e.g., Wirecutter*, N.Y. Times, [perma.cc/4AT6-GES3] (“Wirecutter is the product recommendation service from The New York Times. . . . Whether it’s finding great products or discovering helpful advice, we’ll help you get it right (the first time).”); *Buyside*, Wall Street Journal, [] (“Best-in-class products and services we’ve researched, tested and reviewed.”); *About Popular Mechanics*, Popular Mechanics, [perma.cc/4FVF-K7QV] (120-year old magazine serving as a leading provider of product reviews and consumer information); *About Us*, Healthline, [perma.cc/982N-8W5A] (health news website offering original content and product reviews); *Reviews*, Car and Driver, [] (“a print and digital magazine covering the newest car offerings, showcasing car culture, and helping people shopping for a car by serving up our unique brand of intelligence, independence, and irreverence”); *see also* Walter S. Mossberg, *Top Products in Two Decades of Tech Reviews*, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 2023, [].

1 Here, the City Attorney invokes a statute meant to regulate advertising and
2 commercial activity to investigate U.S. News’ editorial choices. *See* UCL, Cal. Prof.
3 & Bus. Code § 17200 *et seq.*; *see also* *Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of*
4 *Am.*, 115 Cal. App. 4th 322, 347–48 (2004) (declining to regulate Planned
5 Parenthood’s speech under unfair competition and false advertising statutes although
6 speech might have drawn patients to clinics). Seven of the interrogatories included in
7 the City Attorney’s subpoenas seek to intrude squarely into Plaintiff’s editorial
8 process. They demand U.S. News explain the basis for the claim that its rankings
9 permit consumers to “find the best medical care in 2023,” why it factors certain
10 treatments and types of care into its rankings in a certain way, its reasons for not
11 “including measures of health equity” in its rankings, how it uses certain Medicare
12 information, and why it uses opinion surveys as the exclusive method for ranking
13 hospitals in connection with certain specialties. Compl. Ex. D (Dkt. 1-4 at pp. 4–5).
14 The City Attorney attempts to defend against U.S. News’ First Amendment challenge
15 by arguing that because U.S. News accepts advertising and other revenue from
16 ranked hospitals, the rankings themselves, and U.S. News’ claims as to the reliability
17 and trustworthiness of those rankings, are commercial speech subject to regulation
18 under the UCL. Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss & Strike (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 20–21.² That is
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26 ² The City Attorney’s argument about undisclosed revenues to U.S. News from
27 ranked hospitals, Def.’s Mot. at 6–7, is a red herring. The primary focus of his inquiry
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1 a weak attempt at deflection. The subpoenas target core editorial decision-making—
2 how U.S. News researches, designs, and publishes its rankings—and that reporting
3 process, as well as Plaintiff’s speech about that reporting process, is non-commercial
4 speech entitled to full First Amendment protection.
5

6 Commercial speech is confined to “expression related solely to the economic
7 interests of the speaker and its audience.” *Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.*
8 *Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). It is “usually defined as speech that
9 does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” *Bernardo*, 115 Cal. App. 4th
10 at 344 (citing *United States v. United Foods, Inc.*, 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001)). The
11 fact that a publisher has multiple grounds for publishing, some of them commercial
12 and some not, is not enough to diminish their First Amendment rights. *See id.*
13 (“[T]he fact that [the manufacturer] ha[d] an economic motivation for mailing the
14 pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself to turn the materials into commercial
15 speech.’ . . . Similarly here, any ‘economic motivation’ . . . in this case would be
16 insufficient by itself to turn the statements into commercial speech actionable under
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22 and of the subpoenas is the *reliability* of the *methodology* underlying the hospital
23 rankings. The City Attorney is focused on what he perceives to be deficiencies in the
24 methodology Plaintiff has chosen to create those rankings—not whether the *rankings*
25 are somehow themselves covert advertising *by the ranked hospitals*. *See Cf. Ariix,*
26 *LLC v. NutriSearch Corp.*, 985 F.3d 1107, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding alleged
27 extensive collusion benefiting single company qualified nutritional supplement guide
28 as “sham marketing scheme” and therefore proper subject of federal Lanham Act
false advertising claim but declining to rely on allegations of payments alone).

1 the UCL”); *N.Y. Times Co.*, 376 U.S. at 266 (“That the Times was paid for
2 publishing the advertisement is as immaterial . . . as is the fact that newspapers and
3 books are sold.”); *Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc.*, 491 U.S. at 667 (holding that “profit
4 motive” does not “somehow strip communications of the otherwise available” First
5 Amendment protections); *Dex Media West, Inc. v. City of Seattle*, 696 F.3d 952, 960
6 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding Yellow Pages to be non-commercial speech subject to full
7 First Amendment protection because economic motive alone is insufficient to
8 characterize publication as commercial). Were it otherwise, any state action targeted
9 at the editorial activities of a news organization would qualify for lesser scrutiny as a
10 commercial speech regulation. *Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum.*
11 *Rel.*, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (“If a newspaper’s profit motive were determinative,
12 all aspects of its operations—from the selection of news stories to the choice of
13 editorial position—would be subject to regulation if it could be established that they
14 were conducted with a view toward increased sales.”); *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*,
15 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines are published
16 and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose
17 liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”). Simply put, a news outlet
18 endeavoring to investigate, assess, and rank products *sold by others* is engaged in
19 non-commercial speech, and statements about the relative quality or reliability of its
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1 rankings are likewise non-commercial, even if the public’s perception of their
2 reliability could induce sales.

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4 Further, under California law, for speech to be analyzed as commercial under
5 the UCL, the speech must “*consist of factual representations* about the business
6 operations, products, or services of the speaker.” *Bernardo*, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 347
7 (quoting *Nike v. Kasky*, 27 Cal. 4th 939, 962 (2002)) (opinions not actionable under
8 the UCL). But the fact that the City Attorney is seeking to compel U.S. News to
9 provide its “basis” for making certain methodological choices in creating its rankings
10 highlights the inherent subjectivity in such an enterprise. U.S. News says its
11 methodology is sound; the City Attorney says that the absence of, among other
12 things, “health equity” as a factor renders the methodology unreliable. That
13 difference of opinion underscores the non-commercial nature of the speech targeted
14 by the City Attorney. *See also* Letter from David Chiu, San Francisco City Attorney,
15 to Eric Gertler, Executive Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. News &
16 World Report, L.P. (June 20, 2023), [perma.cc/JV27-8FE3] (U.S. News’ hospital
17 rankings “suffer from poor and opaque methodology”); Chiu Press Release, *supra*
18 (rankings “appear to be biased towards providing treatment for wealthy, white
19 patients, to the detriment of poor, sicker, or more diverse populations”).
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25 To treat U.S. News’ hospital ranking methodology and its public statements
26 about the reliability of that methodology as commercial speech could invite similar
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1 enforcement actions based on any news organization’s claims about how it adheres to
2 its editorial standards. For instance, news organizations aspire to provide coverage
3 that is objective, but “arguments about objectivity are endless.” *Policies and*
4 *Standards*, Wash. Post (Jan. 1, 2021), [perma.cc/WN8X-CFMX]. For just that
5 reason, federal courts have routinely concluded that representations about how
6 reporting will be conducted cannot be enforced through the law of fraud or contract
7 without posing grave First Amendment risks. *See, e.g., Veilleux v. Nat’l Broad. Co.*,
8 206 F.3d 92, 121–23 (1st Cir. 2000); *Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos.*, 44 F.3d 1345,
9 1354–55 (7th Cir. 1995); *see also Prager Univ. v. Google LLC*, 951 F.3d 991, 999–
10 1000 (9th Cir. 2020) (concluding that statements related to YouTube’s content
11 moderation standards are not commercial speech under Lanham Act).

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16 Indeed, the courts and Congress, in the false advertising context, have
17 recognized as much specifically with respect to consumer recommendations by news
18 organizations. In extending the Lanham Act to product disparagement, Congress
19 expressly intended to exclude publications that “raise free speech concerns, such as a
20 Consumer Report which reviews and may disparage the quality . . . of products”
21 *See Wojnarowicz v. Am. Fam. Ass’n*, 745 F. Supp. 130, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting
22 S. 1883, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. 1207, 1217 (Apr. 13, 1989)). That
23 law “has never been applied to stifle criticism of the goods or services of another by
24 one, such as a consumer advocate, who is not engaged in marketing or promoting a
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1 competitive product or service.” *Id.* at 141–42 (citing cases). By claiming authority
2 under California law to regulate U.S. News’s hospital rankings as mere commercial
3 speech, subject to lesser First Amendment protection, the City Attorney’s regulatory
4 intervention risks stifling the flow of valuable reporting to the public.
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6 To be sure, the protection of consumers is a legitimate state interest. But
7 regardless of “how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might
8 be, we prefer the power of reason as applied through public discussion and remain
9 intensely skeptical about those measures that would allow government to insinuate
10 itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation’s press.” *Tornillo*, 418 U.S. at 259
11 (internal quotations omitted) (White, J., concurring). Repackaging a difference of
12 opinion between a government official and news outlet over editorial choices as a
13 violation of consumer protection laws carries the acute risk that states will use such
14 laws to sway public discourse in its favor—and undercut the independence the First
15 Amendment was enacted to protect.
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20 **II. The City Attorney cannot target a news outlet with subpoenas because he**
21 **disagrees with its editorial viewpoint.**

22 In 1974, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that the First Amendment
23 forbids governmental interference in the editorial decision-making of the press,
24 holding unconstitutional Florida’s “right of reply” statute, which “grant[ed] a political
25 candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a
26 newspaper.” *Tornillo*, 418 U.S. at 243. In *Tornillo*, the Court found that any such
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1 intrusion “[c]ompelling editors or publishers to publish that which reason tells them
2 should not be published” would violate the First Amendment regardless of motive.
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4 *Id.* at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted). This right to editorial independence has
5 often been called “absolute.” *Passaic Daily News v. NLRB*, 736 F.2d 1543, 1557
6 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., *The Fourth Estate and the Constitution* 277
7 (1992) (“Because editorial autonomy is indivisible, it must be absolute.”).

9 The City Attorney purports to justify the subpoenas by citing concerns about
10 the equity of U.S. News’ hospital rankings. Press Release, David Chiu, San
11 Francisco City Attorney, U.S. News & World Report Faces Legal Scrutiny Over
12 Dubious Hospital Rankings, (June 20, 2023), [perma.cc/K9CS-38AJ]. But whatever
13 validity those concerns do or do not have, *Tornillo* makes clear that editorial
14 fairness—however desirable—“cannot be legislated.” 418 U.S. at 256. Instead, the
15 First Amendment requires that society “take the risk that occasionally debate on vital
16 matters will not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints may not be expressed” to
17 avoid the far graver risk of government censorship. *Id.* at 260 (White, J., concurring).
18 A contrary approach would “bring[] about a confrontation with the express provisions
19 of the First Amendment and the judicial gloss on that Amendment developed over the
20 years.” *Id.* at 254.

25 Writing for the majority in *Tornillo*, Chief Justice Burger described two main
26 consequences of government intrusion in editorial decision-making. First, public
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1 discourse “would be blunted or reduced” as editors took “the safe course . . . to avoid
2 controversy.” *Id.* at 257. Second, government-enforced editorial fairness would
3 directly violate “the unexceptionable, but nonetheless timeless” principle “[w]oven
4 into the fabric of the First Amendment” that “liberty of the press is in peril as soon as
5 the government tries to compel what is to go into a newspaper.” *Id.* at 261 (quoting
6 Zechariah Chafee, *Government and Mass Communications* 633 (1947)). That
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8 fundamental logic—that the government may not substitute its own editorial
9 viewpoint for a private party’s—remains of central importance to the press.³
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12 A publisher’s freedom to articulate its views “lies at the core of publishing
13 control,” a reflection of a news organization’s “untrammelled authority to set
14 standards of workmanship that determine its intrinsic excellence and its quality and
15 public character.” *Newspaper Guild of Greater Phila., Loc. 10 v. NLRB*, 636 F.2d
16 550, 560–62, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Or as Chief Justice
17 Burger put it in *Tornillo*, a private publisher’s power “to advance its own political,
18 social, and economic views” is bound only by “financial success; and . . . the
19 journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.” *Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v.*
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24 ³ The Supreme Court has since applied the First Amendment protection
25 recognized in *Tornillo* to other forms of communication. *See Reno v. Am. C.L.*
26 *Union*, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (the internet); *Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &*
27 *Bisexual Grp. of Bos.*, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (parades); *Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.*
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (private company’s billing envelopes).

1 *Democratic Nat'l Comm.*, 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) (plurality opinion). Under this
2 well-settled law, the City Attorney's subpoenas cannot survive legal scrutiny.

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4 **III. U.S. News' action to vindicate its First Amendment rights is ripe.**

5 The City Attorney and his local government amici argue that because the
6 subpoenas issued to U.S. News have not yet been enforced, Plaintiff's constitutional
7 challenge is not ripe. That argument does not square with precedent.

8
9 It is well settled that "[a]lthough the mere existence of a statute is insufficient
10 to create a ripe controversy" the Ninth Circuit applies the justiciability "requirements
11 of ripeness and standing less stringently in the context of First Amendment claims."
12 *Wolfson v. Brammer*, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). To
13 avoid the chilling effect of adverse government action, "one need not await
14 'consummation of threatened injury' before challenging a statute restricting speech."
15 *Id.*; *see also LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh*, 205 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) ("our finding of
16 a reasonable threat of prosecution . . . dispenses with any ripeness problem"); *Santa*
17 *Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica*, 450 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir.
18 2006) (finding that plaintiff's "apprehension that the Events Ordinance would be
19 enforced against it for engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment
20 without a permit is sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact"). The prudential
21 requirements for ripeness and standing were relaxed "in recognition that 'the First
22 Amendment needs breathing space.'" *Canatella v. California*, 304 F.3d 843, 853
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1 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting *Broadrick v. Oklahoma*, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)). And
2 this relaxed justiciability standard is itself an essential First Amendment protection.
3
4 *See Ariz. Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Bayless*, 320 F.3d 1002, 1007 & n.6 (9th
5 Cir. 2003) (“[I]t would turn respect for the law on its head for us to conclude that
6 [plaintiff] lacks standing to challenge the provision [regulating political advertising]
7 merely because [plaintiff] chose to comply with the statute and challenge its
8 constitutionality, rather than to violate the law and await an enforcement action.”);
9
10 *Majors v. Abell*, 317 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff who mounts a pre-
11 enforcement challenge to a statute that he claims violates his freedom of speech need
12 not show that the authorities have threatened to prosecute him . . . ; the threat is latent
13 in the existence of the statute.” (internal citations omitted)).
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16 It is widely recognized that the possibility of an enforcement action based on
17 the exercise of editorial discretion presents a profound risk of chilling the exercise of
18 First Amendment rights. *See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n*, 484 U.S. 383, 393
19 (1988) (“[T]he alleged danger of this statute is, in large measure, one of self-
20 censorship; a harm that can be realized even without an actual prosecution.”).⁴ That
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24 ⁴ In addressing the merits of a plaintiff’s civil rights claims arising out of an
25 agency investigation, the Ninth Circuit recognized the potential chilling effect that
26 such investigations—even when they do not lead to seizures of materials or eventual
27 sanctions—can have on speakers. *See White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir.
28 2000) (“The investigation by the HUD officials unquestionably chilled the plaintiffs’
exercise of their First Amendment rights. It is true that the agency did not ban or

1 threatened chill is an injury sufficient to confer standing in a pre-enforcement
2 challenge. *Dombrowski v. Pfister*, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (“The chilling effect
3 upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the
4 prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.”). This justiciability
5 standard is an essential protection for the press and other speakers; were it otherwise
6 “[o]nly the stout-hearted will brave prosecution for the sake of publication.” *Van*
7 *Nuys Publ’g Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks*, 5 Cal. 3d. 817, 828 (1971).
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10 Here, the City Attorney and his local government amici argue that this matter is
11 not ripe, in part, because the City Attorney has not gone to court yet to enforce the
12 subpoenas. Defs.’ Mot. at 8; Local Gov’t Amici Br. at 4. The City Attorney further
13 suggests that because he possesses inherent discretion to investigate violations of law,
14 his investigation of U.S. News should be insulated from constitutional challenge.
15 Defs.’ Mot. at 7–11. And local government amici warn that governments will be
16 generally deterred from fulfilling their investigatory functions should this Court
17 consider U.S. News’ pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge to the City
18 Attorney’s subpoenas. Local Gov’t Amici Br. at 10. These arguments ignore the
19 facts of this particular case, and the body of law regarding justiciability in the First
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24 seize the plaintiffs’ materials, and officials in Washington ultimately decided not to
25 pursue either criminal or civil sanctions against them. But in the First Amendment
26 context . . . informal measures, such as ‘the threat of invoking legal sanctions and
27 other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation,’ can violate the First
28 Amendment also.” (citations omitted).

1 Amendment context. Courts have recognized that government threats—even absent
2 direct government authority to take some action—can violate the First Amendment.
3
4 *See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963) (“But though the
5 Commission is limited to informal sanctions—the threat of invoking legal sanctions
6 and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation—the record amply
7 demonstrates that the Commission deliberately set about to achieve the suppression
8 of publications deemed ‘objectionable’ and succeeded in its aim.”).

10 While the ripeness requirement serves “to prevent the courts, through
11 avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
12 disagreements,” this Court is at no risk of doing so here. *Portman v. County of Santa*
13 *Clara*, 995 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The subpoenas, on their
14 face, clearly seek to intrude into U.S. News’ editorial decision-making, *supra* at 5,
15 and neither the rankings nor U.S. News’ speech about its rankings are commercial
16 speech subject to the UCL, *supra* at 5-9. Under these circumstances, the law does not
17 force U.S. News to wait and see whether the City Attorney will seek to force it to
18 comply with subpoenas improperly seeking the disclosure of details, including
19 confidential ones, about U.S. News’ editorial processes. There is ample precedent to
20 support the ripeness of its pre-enforcement challenge to those subpoenas.
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1 **IV. California’s anti-SLAPP law is not a sword to be wielded by government**
2 **officials to defend subpoenas to news organizations.**

3 In response to U.S. News’ Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
4 the City Attorney filed a Motion to Strike pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP
5 statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16. The gist of Defendant’s Motion to Strike is
6 that U.S. News’ lawsuit is a SLAPP intended to silence the City Attorney’s protected
7 speech activity—namely, issuing subpoenas to U.S. News. Def.’s Mot. at 30–36.
8 U.S. News does not assert a claim for defamation—or any other speech-suppressive
9 tort—nor does the City Attorney deny that the mere issuance of the subpoenas is the
10 only purported protected activity upon which his Motion to Strike is based. *Id.* at 31–
11 37. Defendant seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP
12 statute from U.S. News for challenging the subpoenas on First Amendment grounds.
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16 This invocation of California’s anti-SLAPP law is not a cognizable one. When
17 California enacted its anti-SLAPP statute in 1992, it sought to safeguard the “valid
18 exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress
19 of grievances” from the chilling effect of non-meritorious litigation against the press
20 and other speakers. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a). The California Legislature
21 recognized “that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in
22 matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled
23 through abuse of the judicial process.” *Id.* To permit a government official to
24 commandeer that statute to prevent a news outlet—one of the types of speakers the
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1 statute was enacted expressly to protect, *id.*—from challenging subpoenas as violative
2 of its First Amendment rights would turn the purpose of the law on its head.

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4 The City Attorney argues, in essence, that the subpoenas are an act of speech
5 and petition, and that because the anti-SLAPP statute can, under certain
6 circumstances, apply to government actors engaged in their official duties, a legal
7 challenge to the execution of those duties is a SLAPP. Def.’s Mot. At 30–43. But
8 the California Court of Appeal recently rejected that very argument, holding that the
9 anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a claim that a city council had violated the open
10 meetings law by taking action during a closed session without proper notice to the
11 public. *Mary’s Kitchen v. City of Orange*, 96 Cal. App. 5th 1009 (2023). The court
12 found that the claim arose from the city council’s unprotected conduct of making a
13 collective decision to take “a governing action”—not First Amendment protected
14 activity within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. *Id.* at 1017. It explained, “we
15 interpret the complaint as arising from unprotected action . . . and the fact that the
16 agenda had not given proper notice of that action.” *Id.* Therefore, the complaint was
17 not based on any protected speech, even if certain speech—such as “the conversation
18 the city council had with the city attorney” in closed session—might be relevant to
19 resolution of the complaint. *Id.*

20
21 The City Attorney strips the SLAPP statute of its purpose and context, and
22 relies solely on caselaw arising in the defamation context, where courts reached the
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1 noncontroversial conclusion, consistent with the law’s purpose, that the government
2 should be able to issue statements and explain its actions without fear of
3 unmeritorious libel suits.⁵ None of the cases cited by the City Attorney supports the
4 argument that a government official or entity may seek dismissal and an award of
5 fees against a news outlet for challenging the issuance of government process that the
6 news outlet contends runs afoul of its First Amendment rights.
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9 **CONCLUSION**

10 For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully urge the Court to grant Plaintiff’s
11 Motion for Preliminary Injunction and deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and/or to
12 Strike.
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14 Dated: March 20, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

15
16 /s/ Katie Townsend
17 Katie Townsend (SBN 254321)
18 Counsel for amici curiae

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20 ⁵ For example, the City Attorney cites *Bradbury v. Superior Court*, in which a
21 county sheriff filed a lawsuit against law enforcement entities that had issued a public
22 report referencing the sheriff’s conduct in executing a warrant. The agencies moved
23 to dismiss the claims based on their public statements under the anti-SLAPP law.
24 The Court of Appeal held that “if government has a legitimate role to play in the
25 interchange of ideas—as we conclude it does—then government should have some
26 measure of protection in performing that role, at least as to matters of public interest.
27 Otherwise, if government is compelled to guarantee the truth of its factual assertions
28 on matters of public interest, its speech would be substantially inhibited, and the
citizenry would be less informed.” 49 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1115, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207
(1996), as modified on denial of reh'g (Oct. 31, 1996)

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